employ Simon's framework to examine the extent to which international actors in BiH govern through crime. Drawing on documentary analysis and interviews 2 to focus on the EU and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), I explore the possibility of international governance of a state through crime. The paper outlines how Simon's framework is adapted and applied, describes the local context of governance in BiH, and examines the two international bodies in turn. This is not a review of how international and local actors govern crime. Rather, by exploring particular moments of governing action I examine if and how claims of acting against crime may be used as a tool to govern and to secure legitimacy in a context where it is contested. In this enterprise I am mindful of Simon's concern for democracy. Fuelling a culture of fear and control, governing through crime supports actions neither proximate nor proportionate to crime threats, narrows the framework through which governing actors interpret citizens' needs, undermines legislative scrutiny and challenges core democratic values of liberty and equality (Simon 2007: 3-7; 267) . As BiH rebuilds and consolidates democracy, early steps on this path may have a lasting impact on longer term democratic outcomes. I find only limited evidence of governing through crime, which is often ambiguous or opportunistic.
Thus while international actors have used crime scandals to pursue wider political objectives in BiH, this does not evidence the harmful narrowing of the governing framework akin to Simon's observations in the US. I also argue that acknowledging and developing an implicit and reductive focus on criminal justice logics as punitive brings greater analytic precision to the framework, regardless of the context in which it is employed.
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Simon describes the construction of 'a new civil and political order structured around the problem of violent crime ' (2007: 3) in contemporary America. The risk of crime, specifically violent crime, serves as a structuring factor through which policy is conceived, implemented and legitimated, and underpins the exercise of authority.
Three strands bring together a cluster of activities and practices that characterise governing through crime: S1. Governing actors claim to act legitimately when acting against crime as they act on behalf of the victim. The victim becomes a 'symbolic citizen', representing the needs of the wider public.
S2. This legitimacy is politically attractive and is used to cover more contentious political goals.
S3. ' [T] echnologies, discourses and metaphors of crime and criminal justice' spillover and are adopted in other areas of governing. (Simon 2007: 4-5) .
From being one social problem among many, crime becomes the dominant challenge and a model for understanding other problems. In America this mode of governing is apparent in various ways: the increasing salience of crime and punishment in elections; increased legislative activity around criminal justice matters; and rising rates of incarceration.
Neither Simon, nor those using his analytical framework, consistently maintain the focus on violent crime. For example, he draws on accusations of drug use in custody disputes and terminations of public housing tenancies (Simon 2007: 191, 194 ). Baker does not specify the nature of the victim or quasi-victim in her analysis of the EU (2010: 196-199 ). Yet the lack of ambiguity in violence may prove central to claims to legitimacy when governing through crime. Boutellier's concept of victimalisation (2000) stresses the importance of victims in legitimating criminal justice institutions and procedures. In a pluralistic society with weak markers of common identity, a sense of shared vulnerability provides a basis for public morality and the suffering victim becomes a "legitimising metaphor of criminal law" (Boutellier 2000: 15, 45 ).
Boutellier draws on Braithwaite's work, distinguishing predatory from non-predatory crimes. The unequivocally 'clear damage' of the former mobilises communities (Boutellier 2000: 46) . This is equally apparent in Pratt's analysis of narratives supporting populist punitiveness in New Zealand (2008: 368 is still taken as action structuring others' fields of possible action (Foucault, 2000: 341) , the target is a state rather than the citizen and that state's conduct in relation to its own citizens and other states. The state is understood as a 'centre of the exercise of political power' (Poulantzas 1973: 115) In what follows, I sketch out the domestic and international governing arrangements in BiH, before going on to analyse interventions on the part of the EU and OHR.
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The Bosnian constitution was established as part of a wider peace settlement (GFAP 1995) which gave certain powers to state-level institutions, but reserved most, including defence, policing and justice, for two entities: the unitary Republika Srpska pre-accession processes; and functional reviews of government.
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The EUPM monitors police in BiH, with the objective of establishing 'a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service operating in accordance with best European and international standards' (EUPM 2008) . The mission enjoys a high profile, participates in regular press briefings in BiH, produces a regular newsletter, and was the subject of press features outside BiH, particularly when its mandate began or was renewed. This alone is not evidence of a disproportionate focus on crime and criminal justice and so needs to be placed in the context of a wider range of EU activities.
The EUFOR military mission succeeds those of NATO and the UN (see UNSC 1995 UNSC , 1996 UNSC , 2004 ) and aims to contribute to a safe and secure environment and to prevent a resumption of violence (EUFOR undated The example suggests the legitimating power of acting against crime is used to support the contentious end of centralisation (H 2, G 2 ). Yet this interpretation relies on isolating substantive and structural goals. As the quotation below, from a manager at the EC delegation in BiH, shows, it is possible to pursue a substantive anti-crime goal and a structural project of institutional realignment simultaneously. In criminal justice, as elsewhere, the Commission seeks coherent state structures which allow a particular form of interaction with potential member states ( Thus, while there is some evidence that crime risks are mobilised in support of a controversial programme of institutional realignment, it is not clear whether this is due to the legitimating factor of crime or the perceived merits of substantive over institutional goals in communicating particular policy programmes (contra H 2 ).
Moreover, as might be expected given the relatively slight section of the Union acquis handling criminal justice matters, EU activities in BiH cover a spectrum of policy sectors, and risks from crime and criminality are not a strong focal point in these (again, contra H 1 ).
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This We used this report… to insist on the removal of corrupt managers and the cleaning-up of the system, so weakening the nationalist political structures in the area, accelerating the process of creating a single state framework for electricity generation in Bosnia and moving this towards privatisation. Indeed, these audits gave us crucial leverage to push forward the whole process of economic reform at a faster pace… pushing privatisation across the whole economy. (Ashdown 2007: 274) " #
In extent by the distortions of democracy generated by a politically generated and sustained culture of fear.
